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Predictive statements deserve a specific grammatical 
inquiry, since they have not only an epistemological status, 
but also appear in Wittgenstein’s writings on philosophy of 
psychology and touch deeply the problem of free will. So 
predictive knowledge covers a very large spectrum of 
human experience. This grammatical exploration leads to 
acknowledge an essential difference between predictive 
statements, which are expressions or exteriorisations of 
will (Willensäusserungen) and predictions, which are made 
from the perspective of the third person (although they can 
be uttered in the first). As Wittgenstein notes: “Two things 
however, are important: one, that in many cases someone 
else cannot predict my actions, whereas I foresee them in 
my intentions; the other, that my prediction (in my 
expression of intention) has not the same foundation as 
his prediction of what I shall do, and the conclusions to be 
drawn from these predictions are quite different” (PI, Iixi, 
224e). It is the grammatical elucidation of predictive 
language games that allows us to solve the problem of the 
incompatibility between predicted and at the same time 
free choices.  
The problem we wish to clarify in this paper is the 
following: in his Lecture on Freedom of the Will Wittgen-
stein states that “Prediction is incompatible with choice in 
the case where you yourself predict what you will choose, 
or I predict and then tell you” (PO, 442), on the other hand, 
he acknowledges the factum of voluntary choice and 
behaviour in predictive expressions such as “…when it 
strikes 5, I raise my arm”. (PI 627). Thus, on the one hand, 
it seems that the fact that I predict that I will raise my hand 
within 5 minutes, makes it impossible that that event (the 
raising of my hand), in that precise moment, be a true 
choice. On the other hand, if we admit that that movement 
of the hand was voluntary, we seem to implicitly admit that 
it has resulted from a choice: I could give up raising my 
arm. Which therapeutics for this (we’ll see if apparent) 
contradiction? How in this case “to shew the fly the way 
out of the flybottle” (PI 309)? The only way will be to clarify 
the concept of predictive knowledge and the different 
meanings in which we use it. 
Wittgenstein acknowledged a special statute to lan-
guage games that express prediction and, curiously, he 
refers to them almost always with regard to knowledge of 
volitive activity. Thus, the characteristics of predictive 
knowledge, obtained by reflexion on different predictive 
language games are relevant to psychological and cog-
nitive topics, as well as to self-knowledge and to the 
volitive subject nature. One first and decisive characteristic 
of predictive sentences is the asymmetry between predict-
ions that are expressions of will (example of Wittgenstein 
himself: “I am going to take two powders” (PI 632)) and 
predictions that are anticipations of events in the 3rd 
person’s perspective. 
If we consider the predictions: 
“I will raise my arm within 5 minutes” 
“My arm is going to raise itself within 5 minutes, due to 
an electric current that in that moment will stimulate it”, 
it becomes easy to characterize more rigorously the 
asymmetry between (a) and (b).  
More precisely, (a) is a predictive statement under the 
form of an expression or exteriorisation of the 1st person’s 
will (in Wittgenstein’s words, a “Willensaüsserung”), while 
(b) is a pre-knowledge of a future event, and the one who 
predicts is, in this case, an observer, and not an agent, 
even though he keeps speaking in the 1st person. (Notice 
that, the first sentence (a) is equal to “I want to raise my 
arm within 5minutes”). Thus, the last sentence (b) is truly a 
prediction of the 3rd person’s perspective, even though it is 
pronounced in the 1st person of the indicative present. 
Truth is that, in that situation, the subject is someone who 
places himself in the position of observer of an event that 
he does not control, even though the prediction concerns 
the movement of his hand. 
An identical asymmetry between these types of predic-
tion was described by Wittgenstein in PI 627. There, he 
offers two possible descriptions of voluntary movement: 
“Examine the following description of a voluntary action: ‘I 
form the decision to pull the bell at 5 o’clock, and when it 
strikes 5, my arm makes this movement’. Is that the correct 
description, and not this one: ‘…and when it strikes 5, I 
raise my arm’?…”. Wittgenstein adds that the correct 
description of voluntary act does not include surprise, as 
he writes in the next section (PI 628): “So one might say: 
voluntary movement is marked by the absence of 
surprise”. With this remark, Wittgenstein emphasizes an 
important characteristic of that kind of acts. There will be 
surprise only in those predictions where the subject does 
not verify the accomplishment of the event that he had 
predicted on the basis of external rules and events. For 
example, I predict a certain chemical reaction when I 
assemble two elements because I have verified it every 
time I made that experiment in laboratory, or I predict the 
behaviour of someone I know in a certain situation, 
because I have observed that same behaviour of his 
several times in identical situations, etc. Any of these 
predictions will provoke surprise in the subject that 
predicts, if the events predicted do not take place. But 
when the prediction is a volitive expression of the 1st 
person, “…and when it strikes 5, I raise my arm”, surprise 
can not arise and it makes no sense to say: “See, my arm 
is going up!”. 
When Wittgenstein notices that it is the absence of 
surprise that characterizes voluntary movement, it is 
important to ask if surprise does not exist because in the 
prediction of a voluntary movement made in the 1st person 
the subject knows in a completely infallible way his actions. 
Does the subject, in the prediction of his voluntary acts 
made by himself have a special knowledge, radically 
different from the other types of predictions made in the 3rd 
person’s point of view? Our suggestion is that it should not 
be this the interpretation of the characteristic of absence of 
surprise that Wittgenstein refers with regard to voluntary 
action prediction made by the one that predicts. There is 
surprise when something doesn’t happen in the chain of a 
process we thought we knew. For example, if my arm does 
not move itself when stimulated by an electric current, I 
can’t help surprising myself. In fact, it was on the basis of 
the observation of what happened every time my arm was 
stimulated that I made the prediction which then, surpris-
ingly, didn’t occur. At first sight, one would say that in the 
case of predictions in the 3rd person’s point of view, it is a 
knowledge that still allows error and, therefore, surprise: 




the subject realizes that, after all, his prediction was 
fallible. Is it the case, then, that the prediction made in the 
form of a 1st person expression is infallible and because of 
that there is no place for surprise? Well, it’s not that what 
happens in these expressions or Willensäusserungen. The 
truth is that type (a) sentences are not more certain than 
type (b) ones; on the contrary, these are the ones that 
deserve to be called knowledge. In fact, any prediction I 
make relatively to any voluntary behaviour of mine in the 
future can fail, and we all have the experience of the 
contingency of that our kind of predictions. I only have to 
decide otherwise before the predicted event. But precisely, 
because it is me who decides, I cannot surprise myself 
with the fact that the prediction I made about my future 
behaviour did not fulfil. The absence of surprise is, then, 
due to the fact that the predicted event depends on my 
decision, since the moment of its prediction, until its 
fulfilment (or not fulfilment). Once again, notice how, in 
fact, it is grammatically possible to say that I doubt that my 
hand will raise itself within 5 minutes (prediction in the 
perspective of the observer, or the 3rd person), and it 
makes grammatically no sense to say that I doubt that I 
have the intention of raising my hand within 5 minutes 
(predictive expression of the 1st person). 
The prediction made by myself of my voluntary behav-
iours is, then, a special case among the totality of 
predictive knowledge. Wittgenstein attributes two funda-
mental characteristics to it: 1) the absence of surprise and 
2) the fact of not being made on the basis of observation of 
myself. Such characteristics distinguish the predictive 
expression (in the sense of Willensäusserung) from all the 
other forms of prediction, which are pre-knowledge in the 
3rd person’s point of view. Between predictive knowledge 
based on observation of the others or of myself, and the 
one that doesn’t need that ground, there is a notable 
difference. “Why do I have doubts about his intentions, but 
not about mine? To what extent am I indubitably ac-
quainted with my intention? That is, what is the use, the 
function, of the expression of intention? That is, when is 
something an expression of intention? Well, when the act 
follows it, when it is a prediction, I make the prediction, the 
same one as someone else makes from observation of my 
behaviour, without this observation” (RPP I, 788).  
But can we speak of knowledge when we refer to this 
kind of predictions? Volitive predictions, in which the 
subject announces a behaviour or decision of his, are, 
after all, expressions or exteriorizations of the will, and 
because of that, much different from the cognitive point of 
view, from the other predictions obtained by the observa-
tion of states of affairs or behaviours. So that expressions 
and exteriorizations of the will, intentionality, belief, pain, 
etc. could be knowledge, they would have to, from the 
beginning, be subject to the game of certainty and doubt, 
but it makes no sense to doubt that “I want p” or “I intend 
p” or “I have a pain”. To Wittgenstein, sentences like “ ‘I 
know what I want, wish, believe, feel,…..’ (and so on 
through all the psychological verbs) is either philosophers’ 
nonsense, or at any rate not a judgement a priori” (PI II, xi, 
221e). Likewise, “I can know what someone else is 
thinking, not what I am thinking. It is correct to say ‘I know 
what you are thinking’ and wrong to say ‘I know what I am 
thinking’. (A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a 
drop of grammar)” (PI, II, xi, 222e). In a similar way, also in 
the prediction that exteriorises or expresses a future 
voluntary behaviour of the subject himself, there is no  
 
 
place for doubt. I cannot say with sense that I doubt that I 
want p, or that I intend p, but I can say with sense that I 
doubt that it will rain tomorrow or that someone with a 
certain disease will die, even though a better observation 
and a more profound knowledge of physical laws might, 
later, deny such utterances. If knowledge supposes the 
possibility of doubt, then, it is possible to say that expres-
sive predictions in the 1st person of my acts are pseudo-
knowledge, because the term knowledge always evolves 
the game of certainty and doubt. Those predictions are 
outside the game of knowledge and doubt. Actually, it is 
grammatically impossible that that game enters in the 
predictions that are exteriorisations of the 1st person. 
From that we conclude that the asymmetry between 
sentences of type (a) and type (b) is not epistemological. 
In fact it would be epistemological if we assumed that in 
the first ones the subject knows his future decision in a 
way that the other does not (the one of raising his hand), 
because it is he who predicts his behaviour and, thus, he 
cannot be wrong, while in type (b) sentences it will always 
be possible to there be an error about the physical process 
that causes the raising of the hand, whether the prediction 
is made by me or by somebody else. This would be an 
epistemological asymmetry, which extreme version 
supposes a kind of cartesian transparency based in an 
introspective faculty (on this subject, see Hacker, 2001, 
133-36). But we have already seen that in the expressive 
prediction of the 1st person it is not correct to say that the 
subject knows his future decision (to raise or not my arm). 
Predictive expressions of the type “I’m going to raise my 
hand within 5 minutes” are exteriorisations of the will, 
Willensäusserungen, and not predictive knowledge like 
sentence (b) or “it will rain tomorrow”. To say that “I want to 
(or I intend to) raise my hand within 5 minutes” is a pseudo 
predictive knowledge, but an exteriorisation of the will, 
which logic is essentially different from a knowledge in 
which I always place myself as observer of the 3rd person’s 
perspective. 
Let’s go back to the difficulty enounced in the beginning. 
How to affirm, on the one hand, that the prediction of my 
behaviour annuls its voluntary character and, on the other 
hand, to admit that the raising of my hand, in sentences 
like “I’m going to raise my hand within 5 minutes”, 
corresponds to a true choice? The contradiction is solved if 
we admit that, on the one hand, the prediction of voluntary 
acts can be made from the perspective of the 3rd person 
and, in this case, the true choice is, in fact, annulled. It will 
be said, then, that the previous knowledge of my future 
decision annuls its true choice character. However, in the 
case in which the prediction is an expression of will or 
intention in the 1st person of indicative present, the 
predicted choice is not annulled and it is possible to speak 
of voluntary behaviour. That’s why Wittgenstein in the 
mentioned Lecture on freedom of the Will also says that 
“As a matter of fact, it is possible we know the whole time 
what we are going to choose and that nevertheless a 
process of choice is going on” (PO, 442)  
In conclusion, predictive knowledge of the 3rd person’s 
point of view is not compatible with free choice, even 
though a free choice may take place being announced 
(predicted) by an expression of the will in the 1st person. 
But as we saw, in this case, we are in presence of a false 
knowledge. 
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